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 The increase of cyber-attacks on industrial and power systems in the recent 
years make the cybersecurity of supervisory control and data acquisition and 
substation automation systemsa high important engineering issue. This paper 
proposes a defense in depth cybersecurity solution for smart substations in 
different layers of the substation automation system. In fact, it presents 
possible vulnerabilities in the substation automation system and propose a 
multiple layer solution based on best practice in cyber security such as the 
hardening ofdevices, whitelisting, network configuration, network 
segmentation, role-based account management and cyber security 
management and deployement. 
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The power grid is a national critical infrastructure that plays an important pillar for the development 
of a nation, when electricity stops everything stop. The growth of power grid and the use of communication 
technologies make it vulnerable to cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks, vandalism and other threats. According to 
National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST the threats of cyber-attacks on Supervisory control and 
data acquisition SCADA has increased four times in the last years. 
The first attack on a power grid was the attack on a Ukrainian utility (Ivano-Frankivsk) SCADA in 
December 2015. First, the hacker got access to the SCADA and started disabling the power backup system. 
Then, he blocked the customer call centres. Finally, he started opening circuit breakers and deleting user’s 
accounts which prevent the operators from closing the circuit breakers to restore normal state. the damages of 
these attack were a disconnection of 30 substations which impacted 225 000 customers for 3 hours [1].  
The impact of this attack shows the necessity of taking actions to secure the power grid against cyber-attacks. 
Substations are the hearth of the power grid, and the security of the power grid needs to be done first 
at the substations level. As new modern substations or smart substations are based on IEC61850 standards 
and Ethernet communication; also, they are connected to SCADA and corporate network, which make them 
more vulnerable to cyber-attacks [2]. Recently, the cyber security in substations has received more and more 
attention [3]-[4]. 
There have been many researches and actions on the cybersecurity of substations. In fact, the 
Technical Committee Number 57 TC57 of the International Electrotechnical Commission IEC has already 
developed several standards to solve security problems in the automation system IEC 62351 standards for 
Power systems management and associated information exchange-data and communications  
security [5]-[6]. The IEC 62443 standard defines security for industrial control systems of the power systems. 
These standards give a guideline on how to apply cybersecurity in operation and maintenance [7].  
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More researches have been done on the cybersecurity of the substations. In [8]-[10] authors 
presented solutions for intrusion detection based on IEC61850 protocol. In [8]-[11] some cybersecurity test-
bed where presented to test and detect vulnerabilities in the Substation Automation System SAS based on 
fuzzy test. Some researches presented physical security using unidirectional gateways [12], while others were 
interested in adding encryption to protocol [13]. 
However, these works stay insufficient for cybersecurity of SAS because it will be too late to detect 
an intrusion if it is not stopped at first place because until the zero day attack the hacker can cause severe 
damages on the substation. Moreover, the standards have not been implemented by manufactures because 
they are focusing on operation more than security, for example the application of the encryption proposed in 
standards IEC62351-5 caused a time delay to the packets which is not accepted in the operation of SAS.  
The proposed solutions in literature for cybersecurity in substation are in most time not practical or complex 
to be implemented in the SAS. Most researches focused on external attacks but not much on how to prevent 
from internal attacks. In reality, there is more requirements of in-depth investigation, analysis and practical 
solution for cybersecurity. To this end, this paper proposes a realistic defense in depth solution for 
cybersecurity in smart substations based on best practices in cybersecurity in order to prevent internal and 
external treats of cyber-attacks at different levels of the SAS. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the architecture of smart 
substations with the IEC61850 protocol. Section 3 gives an overview of the cyber vulnerabilities in 
substation automation systems and their impact on substation operation. Based on the vulnerabilities 
presented in section 2, section 4 presents a framework of cybersecurity for substation. Finally, section 5 
concludes this paper and suggests future research work. 
 
 
2. SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The substation automation system in smart substation uses a three-layer architecture formed of 
substation level, bay level and process level. The substation level contains Human Machine Interfaces that 
displays the status of IEDs, bay controller and other devices, it allows operators to control the primary 
equipment such as circuit breakers and disconnectors. The substation level contains also engineering 
workstation that allows configuration and settings of all devices in the substation. The substation is 
monitored remotely by control centre connected via a gateway, and the communication is ensured according 
to some protocols such as IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 60870-5-101, DNP3 or the new protocol IEC61850-90-2 
[14]-[15].  
The bay level comprises Intelligent Electronic Devices IED such as numeric protective relays, bay 
controllers and network analyser. The process level contains margin unit that sends periodical sampled value 
of three phases current and voltage using the Sampled Measure Values SMV; also, the process comprises 
intelligent circuit breaker that controlled by Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event GOOSE [16]-[17]. 
The interfaces between these three levels are two networks.  
The substation network connects equipments in substation level with devices in bay level. In the 
substation network the Manufacturing Message Specification MMS is adopted for the client/server 
communication, the Precision Time Protocol PTP defined in IEEE 1588 is used for high precision time 
synchronisation for the SAS [18], other protocols such as Simple Network Management Protocol SNPM is 
used for Management of SAS network, File Transfer Protocol FTP is used to transfer setting to IEDs and The 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol is used to get access to embedded web server in some IEDs. The process 
network connects the bay level and the process level, while GOOSE and SMV are adopted for real time high 
speed communication. Figure 1 presents the architecture of a smart substation. 
 
 
3. SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEMVULNERABILITIES 
The substation is exposed to wide range of cyber threats, these threats can be external threats such as 
terrorist, spying or hackers; also, they can be internal threats intended by disgruntled employees or 
inadvertently threats caused in maintenance phases. Figure 2 depict the several points from where an intruder 
can get access to the SAS. 
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Figure 1. Smart substation architecture 
 
 
Figure 2. Vulnerable points in a smart substation 
 
 
The signification and the impact of the intruder in each point from Figure 2 is described below. 
a. Point 1: Control centre 
If the intruder get access to the control centre, he can send control orders to the substation’s primary 
equipments, which will cause a disturbance or a blackout to the power system. 
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b. Point 2: Corporate Network 
If the intruder get access to the enterprise corporate network, he can get data that are confidential 
from the substation such as real energy consumption.  
c. Point 3: Gateway for communication with control centre 
The intruder can do an attack in two ways. First, a malware in USB key because gateways often use 
an embedded operating system which will make it easily implemented. The malware can send false data to 
control centre and control orders to the primary equipments. Second, the intruder can pretend to be the 
gateway by using a simulator of legacy protocol such as IEC60870-5-101, IEC60870-5-104 or DNP3 and 
send false measurements and data to the control centre, which can affect applications installed in control 
centre that use these data such as energy management system or distribution management system. Also, the 
intruders can interrupt control orders from control centre and send false feedback, which can disturb the 
power system for example in the case of isolating a heavy load. 
d. Point 4: Gateway for communication with enterprise 
The same case at point 3, the intruder can pretend to be this gateway and send false measurements 
which will affect reports used by the enterprise or infect the gateway by USB key malware. 
e. Point 5: Human Machine Interface 
The HMI is one of the crucial point to be protected in a substation because it contains interfaces to 
control the primary equipment and have many vulnerabilities. In fact, the intruder can do several attacks in 
the HMI, for instance, he can crack the password of the user’s accounts and starts executing control orders to 
shut down the substation; also, he can use a fake IEC61850 client and send controls to different IEC61850 
servers. Besides, he can delete archives and user’s accounts or inject a malware via a USB key.  
f. Point 6: Engineering Work station 
The EWS is often used to change the setting and parameters of protective relays, bay controller and 
gateways. If the intruder get access to the EWS, he can send false setting to relays which will cause trips or 
can change communication parameters for the communication with control centre which will lead to 
communication interruption. Also, he can change the Substation Configuration Language of IEDs which will 
disturb the whole SAS. 
g. Point 7: station bus 
If the intruders get access to the station bus switches he can use an IEC61850 simulator in order to 
interrupt, tamper, pretend and replay the MMS, SNMP or PTP ethernet packets which can lead to trips, 
Denial of service DoS by packet storm or erroneous synchronisation for the entire system. 
h. Point 8: IED 
The intruder can get access to the IED directly from the communication front port, available in the 
totality of IEDs, by using unsecure communication protocol such as telnet. 
The intruder can change the setting, parameters or update faulty firmware to the IED which will cause an 
equipment failure or trips of circuit breakers. 
i. Point 9: Process bus 
If the intruders get access to the process bus switches he can interrupt, tamper, pretend and replay 
the GOOSES and SV messages which can lead to trips, DoS. 
j. Point 10: IED CB 
As the control of IED CB is connected to the process bus by Ethernet, the intruder can pretend to be 
the IED of a circuit breaker and send false position which will cause problems to the operation of the 
substation and the power system. 
k. Point 11: Mergin Unit 
The intruder can pretend to be the MU and send false measurements of current and voltage to 
protective relays which will cause trips. 
In addition to these points, there still other inadvertently threats than can affect the security of the 
substations such as equipment failure, disconnection of equipment’s, loss of servers or misconfiguration of 
IED which must be taken in consideration of cybersecurity of substation. 
 
 
4. DEFENSE IN DEPTH SOLUTION 
Defense in depth is a concept inspired from the military where an enemy cannot defeat effortlessly a 
compound and multi-layered defines system than to puncture a single fence. The same Principle is applied in 
the domain of information systems by the use of multiple security countermeasures to protect the integrity of 
the information network.  
Defense in depth reduce the probability that an intruder can succeed to penetrate the system. 
Defense in depth can also help to identify intruders who attempt to the system. If an intruder gains access to a 
system, defense in depth reduce the harmful impact and gives administrators and engineers time to update 
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countermeasures and prevent future attacks. In this paper, we propose a defense in depth solution for the 
cybersecurity of substation automation system in smart substation. Figure 3 depict the proposed defense in 





Figure 3. Defense in depth solution 
 
 
4.1. Architecture  
The loss of a GOOSE or SV in the case of communication cable failure can lead to disastrous 
damages to the substation. As a mitigation to this problem, we encourage the use of redundancy architecture 
for the SAS. For the process bus, it is recommended to use High availability seamless redundancy (HSR) 
protocol and for the substation network, it is recommended to use the Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) as 
described in IEC 62439-3 standards [19]. These two seamless protocols offer more security to the SAS as any 
loss of GOOSE or SV packets can be recovered in 0ms. 
Security of protective relays can be enhanced using local backup protection as presented in [20] 
which offer a backup of protective relay in case of their failure or a trip failure. Also, we encourage to use 
PTP for synchronisation as it offers a better synchronisation accuracy of 1us comparing to IRIG which offers 
a synchronisation accuracy of 1ms. 
 
4.2. Network Segmentation 
We propose to segments the network of substation to three zones separated by firewalls as it will 
offer more security because if an intruder compromise the perimeter zone he must compromise the other 





Figure 4. Network segmentation in smart substation 
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Zone 3: Is a Demilitarized Zone which contains the gateway for communication with enterprise network, and 
it should be via a Virtual Private Network. 
Zone 2: Contains the EWS, Log servers, HMI and gateway for communication with the control centre. 
Zone 1: Contains the station bus and the process bus with MU, IED and Circuit breaker. 
 
4.3. Firewalls  
Firewall must be configured to authorise only needed services or protocols for communication 
between the three segmented zones. These will hide the network structure and devices from outside view. 
 
4.4. Secure Protocols 
All unsecure protocol or clear text protocols must be disabled because data such as username and 
password are transferred without encryption and a simple sniffing can get them. we encourage to use only the 
secure version for example. For the network management the use of Simple Network Management Protocol 
V3 SNMPv3 instead of SNMPv1 or v2. For file transfer the use of Secure File Transfer Protocol SFTP 
instead of FTP. For web server the use of the secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTPS instead of HTTP. 
For device configuration the use of SSH Secure Shell instead of Telnet. 
 
4.5. Hardening Devices 
One of best solution against internal attack is hardening devices in substations. Hardening devices 
mean that all unused ports, protocols or services in a device must be disabled. For each equipment in the 
architecture we propose some actions to be taken. Switches: The first action is to disable the default admin 
account and create new account with complex password. The second action 2 is to disable unused ports for 
communication. The third action is to enable secure protocol and disable unsecure protocols such as HTTP, 
FTP and Telnet. Besides, we suggest to associate ports with media access control (MAC) address for all 
devices in the SAS. In this case, If the intruder tries to connect a device into a port that is assigned to MAC 
address the port will be disabled preventing access to the network. 
Computers: Gateways and HMI are industrial computers that are running on windows operating 
system. The first action is to be sure that the operating system is installed from trusted and certified CD 
because engineers often install windows form materials downloaded from the internet, so these materials 
could be infected or have some vulnerabilities. The second action is to install the latest updates from the 
operating system provider that correct all vulnerabilities detected in previous version. The third Action is to 
disable all USB port as malwares and virus can be injected via USB key drivers. Action 4 is to disable all 
unused services, application or ports in the computer. IED: for the bay controllers or numeric protective 
relays we suggest to delete default user and password and use more complex password. 
 
4.6. Access Control Management 
Another solution for protection against internal treats can be done by using access control 
management. For this aim we suggest to apply the recommendation of part 8 form IEC62351, which is Role-
based access control. For every device in the substation the RBAC should be deployed, so for every user in 
the substation access should be grunted only for object concerning this user operation. for example, some 
operator will have access only to open or close primary equipment but will not have access to change setting 
of relay settings. The RBAC allows to divide access by areas of expertise which prevent from unintentional 
operation fault and from disgruntled employees. For computers based on windows operating system, we 
suggest to use a domain controller to secure authentication requests. 
 
4.7. Monitor Traffic 
The Monitoring of logging activities and unsuccessful login attempts can give an idea about the way 
user are operating the SAS. For this aim, we suggest to deploy logs system manager which will collect logs 
from all devices using Syslog protocol following standard RFC3164 and RFC 5424. This will give the 
possibility to create historical audit trails of individual user account access activity. 
 
4.8. White-listing 
In addition to the antivirus that should be installed on computer we suggest to add a white listing 
program, this will allow only trusted applications and services declared in the list to be executed, which will 
Blocks any malicious software, even if it is unknown. 
 
4.9. Backup & Restore 
One way to enhance the SAS security from equipment’s failure is to have a backup and restore 
policy. The backup and restore of computers will be automatic using dedicated software. In the case IED 
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setting are stored in their internal memory, so the backup will be manually by taking a copy of the last known 
validated settings. In the case of an equipment failure, for example, a computer or a IED damaged due to an 
overvoltage in the auxiliary power supply, the maintenance team can change the equipment and inject to 
backup setting which will offer them better time in comparison to the case if they don’t have a backup and 
should configure it from zero. 
 
4.10. Cybersecurity Management  
Cyber security is an ongoing process that encompasses procedures, policies, software, and hardware. 
We suggest to implement a plan for managing incidence response in case of any external or internal 





Figure 5. Cybersecurity management plan 
 
 
First, if a detection of a vulnerability occurs, an impact analysis on the SAS should be carry out.  
Then, a Patch to fix the vulnerability should be found and tested before being applied to the SAS. Finally, a 
report about the vulnerability should be shared with other vendors. Cybersecurity procedures and policies 






Figure 6. Cybersecurity life cycle 
 
 
The first step is to determine baseline risk and security levels. The second step is to design the 
system using the appropriate security measurements as we recommended. The third step is to implement the 
security measurements and procedures with the purpose to obtain the minimal impact on the operation of 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Although the fact that the defense in depth comes into sight to be a complex and fatiguing solution 
to implement in substation automation systems, it is mandatory to apply it on power grids because the cyber-
attacks become dangerous to substations; also, the multiple layers of security is an efficient way to prevent 
from external attacks and especially from internal treats that are hard to be detected or prevented as the major 
element in internal treats are human whether attacks are intended or unintentional wrong operations. 
In this paper, first, we present the smart substation architecture based on the IEC61850 protocol. 
Second, we present different vulnerable point in the substation automation system of a smart substation. 
Finally, we present the defense in depth solution. In the future, the development of intelligent cryptographic 
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